The Secret Organization and Its Role

What does “organization” mean? It is obvious that it did not mean a well-organized party with its modern concept–namely a complex made up of organized staff and regional and municipal headquarters and so on and so forth–and it cannot mean so. “Organization” meant a group of people who did a variety of tasks and duties in connection with a center and a beating heart and a commanding mastermind with a common goal, and also had had a type of close and kinship-like relation among themselves.
At the time of ‘Alī (P.B.U.H.)–that is during a twenty-five-year interval between Saqīfa and the Caliphate–this population were those very noble classes of the companions (of the holy Prophet (P.B.U.H. & H.H)) were the ones who, despite the self-righteous protests and general popularity of the caliphate’s apparatus, believed that governance is the right of the most superior and the most devoted Muslim–that is ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (P.B.U.H.)–and those who had not forgotten the Prophet’s (P.B.U.H. & H.H.) stipulation for ‘Alī’s (P.B.U.H.) succession and in the first few days after (the event of) Saqīfa also explicitly announced their opinion of their objection to the winners of the Caliphate and also their allegiance to the Imam (P.B.U.H.).
Later on, as well, although according to a great interest that had forced the Imam (P.B.U.H.) to be silent and even to cooperate with the early Caliphs, they were put in a normal and ordinary course of a Muslim society, yet they had never disregarded their authentic resolve and opinion and assessment, and always remained the followers of ‘Alī (P.B.U.H.); and it was for this reason that they rightly received the name of “the Shi‘ites of ‘Alī (P.B.U.H.)” and it was due to this intellectual and practical orientation that they became well known. Famous and honorific figures such as Salmān, Abū Dhar (al-Ghafārī), Ubayy b. Ka‘b, Miqdād, ‘Ammār, Ḥudhayfa and … are among the Imam’s (P.B.U.H.) followers.
Historical evidence confirms that this group would constantly spread Shi‘ite Thought–that is the belief in the necessity of adhering to the Imam (P.B.U.H.) as the intellectual leader and political guide–along with the pragmatic and wise methods among the people and would gradually increase their number, something that was considered to be an obligatory prelude to the formation of the ‘Alawite government.
After Amīr al-Mu’minīn (P.B.U.H.) came to power in 35 A.H., the only people who had acknowledged Shi‘ite criteria in the field of governance and the Imamate and had accepted the Imam (P.B.U.H.) on the basis of those criteria with strong faith were the very same Shi‘ite group–namely those who had been directly or indirectly educated by the Imam (P.B.U.H.) during the past twenty or so years. Others–that is the majority of people–although they lived in the realm of the Imam’s (P.B.U.H.) leadership and were actually taking steps in the direction of Shi‘a thought, yet they did not enjoy (the fruits of) the intellectual and spiritual attachment that would make them join the group of Shi‘ite organization.
It is due to this dualism among the proponents of the Imam (P.B.U.H.) that the very different encounters of Muslims of those days with the Imam (P.B.U.H.) are justified and interpreted; that is, such figures as ‘Ammār, Mālik Ashtar, Ḥujr b. ‘Udayy, Sahl b. Ḥunaif and Qais b. Sa‘d and others like Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī, Zīyād b. Abīh and Sa‘d b. Abī Waqqās.
One must accept the fact that if indeed the first steps for establishing a Shi‘ite organization were taken during this meeting, the plan and its context had been forecast and predicted a long time before that in a speech from Imam ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (P.B.U.H.) (while) speaking to his close companions.
After the incidence of Imam Ḥasan’s (P.B.U.H.) peace (treaty), it was the spreading of Shi‘ite thought and organizing this joint group and relatives which, now, due to the cruel domination of the Umayyad sultan and the pressure that was exerted upon it, that it could enjoy greater mobility and dynamism. Thus it is always such that strangulation and pressure instead of being an agent of failure in the cohesive forces under pressure, it causes them to be the more coherent, sterner, and more widespread.
Gathering of genuine and reliable Shi‘ite forces, protecting them from the harm of relentless anti-Shi‘ite conspiracies of the Umayyad apparatus, the expanse of genuine Islamic thought in a limited, but deep circle, the recruiting of potential forces and adding them to the Shi‘ite group, waiting for a suitable opportunity, and finally, uprising and timely and duly measures that obliterated the ignorant Umayyad system, and, again, replacing it with the Islamic and ‘Alawite regime; this was Imam Ḥasan’s (P.B.U.H.) strategy and the final reason that made the acceptance of peace for that Imam (P.B.U.H.) inevitable.
Apparently, it was for this reason that after the incidence of peace, when a group of Shi‘ites that were led by Musayyab b. Najaba and Sulaymān b. Ṣurad Khuzā‘ī went to Medina–where the Imam (P.B.U.H.) had just returned back to from Kūfa and again had made that city his intellectual and political base–and went to visit his holiness and recommended the restructuring of the military forces and the seizure of Kūfa and they raised the subject of the attack of the Syrian army. The Imam (P.B.U.H.) selected these two persons from among the group and summoned them to his presence and convinced them about the incorrectness of this plan with statements that are by no means known as of their quality and quantity, and when they returned to their friends and co-travelers and made it clear in a brief and secret statement that the issue of military uprising is ruled out and that they must return to Kūfa and go about their business.
It is with regards to these indications that Ṭāhā Ḥusayn–a contemporary vigilant Arab historian–believed that the first corner stone of the Shi‘ite political organization was laid on that very day and in that very assembly when these two famous Shi‘ite figures visited and negotiated with Imam Ḥasan (P.B.U.H.).
“When you have lost me, most probably you will see things that you will hope for death: injustice, enmity, monopolization (or exclusion), taking Allah’s Divine right lightly and being afraid of one’s life; when that happens, you must protect yourselves collectively by means of a Divine relationship with Allah and not to become scattered. Engage in resistance and prayer–remembrance of Allah–and taqīyyah and know that Allah dislikes constant changing of colors of His servants. Don’t trespass truth and the people of truth; because whosoever chooses another one instead of us, (he/she) will lose this world and depart (from) it (as) a sinner.”
This statement, which is openly descriptive of the most important irregularities of the Umayyad period and a command for setting up organization and coordination, is to be regarded as among the most interesting documents relating to the Shi‘ite party; and it is this very plan that finds a practical and concrete form in this meeting with Imam Ḥasan (P.B.U.H.) and two of the most elite Shi‘ites.
Undoubtedly, not all of the followers and Shi‘ites were aware of this very clever plan. The mystery of these objections and protests that were targeted at the Imam (P.B.U.H.) from the friends, was this very issue; but an answer that is allegedly repeated heard about this theme from the Imam (P.B.U.H.) as to, “For all we know, perhaps this is a test for you and a perishable gain–for your enemy,” had a hidden allusion to the same policy and strategy.
During Mu‘āwīya’s 20 years of tyrannical governance, with a painful account that historians have provided about how he propagated against the ‘Alawites in all regions of the country–to the point that cursing Amīr al-Mu’minīn had become a common and prevalent tradition–and without Imam Ḥasan (P.B.U.H.) and Imam Ḥusayn’s (P.B.U.H.) visible and significant activities being obvious, was the existence of such continuity and a integrity and an organization alone that allowed for the possibility of growth of the Shi‘ite thought and the increase of the number of the Shi‘ite population throughout Ḥijāz and Iraq.
Twenty years after the incidence of the peace treaty we look at intellectual realm of these regions. In Kūfa, Shi‘ite dignitaries are the most celebrated and the most famous respectable figures. In Mecca and Medina and even some remote areas, Shi‘ites, as well, are connected to each other like the rings of a chain and are informed about one another. When, after several years, one of the Shi‘ite leaders–Ḥujr b. ‘Udayy–was murdered, despite the severe strangulation, an outcry of protest rose up in several areas of the country, and a famous figure died from severe grief in Khurāsān, after the angry protest. After Mu‘āwīya’s death, thousands of people wrote a letter to Imam Ḥusayn (P.B.U.H.) and invited him to Kūfa to rise up. After the martyrdom of the Imam (P.B.U.H.), tens of thousands of people joined the group who wanted to get revenge and, in the event of the Penitents (Tawwābīn) or along the militia of Mukhtār and Ibrāhīm b. Mālik, revolted against the Umayyad government.
The reviewer of Islamic history asks himself: Is the circulation of Shi‘ite thinking and tendencies to this extent, would be possible and reasonable except under the patronage of one calculated organization from a group of united Shi‘ites–namely from the very organization that Imam Ḥusayn (P.B.U.H.) had guessed its birth immediately after the peace of Imam Ḥasan (P.B.U.H.)? No doubt the answer is negative. The calculated propagation of the dominant Umayyad apparatus that was managed by hundreds of judges, reciters, orators and governors, other than another calculated propaganda that was managed from a joined group and one direction and, of course, hidden, could not have replied and even in some cases neutralized them.
Close the time of Mu‘āwīya’s death, this organized activity became greater and its setting was more accelerated; to the point that the governor of Medina wrote to Mu‘āwīya, “Now then, ‘Umar b. ‘Uthmān–the respective agent–reported that some of the men of Iraq and some of the leading people of Ḥijāz have relationships with Ḥusayn and it is suspected that he intends to rise up. I have done an investigation about this and have been informed that He–Ḥusayn–intends to raise the flag of opposition. Write your opinion and command [to me].”
After the event of Karbalā and the Imam’s (P.B.U.H.) martyrdom, the organized activities of the Shi‘ites in Iraq had become more orderly and more mobilized; and this was the effect that it had created on the Kūfan Shi‘ites’ psychological condition–of which many of them were taken by surprise due to the blow of caliphate apparatus and were unable to reach the scene of the Battle on ‘Āshūrā–and the burning of regret and pain, gave them color and luster.
Ṭabarī, the famous historian of the century, writes: “That group–the Shi‘ites–were continuously busy collecting weapons, and making preparations for war, and the secret invitation of people–whether Shi‘ite or non-Shi‘ite–to revenge the blood of Ḥusayn (P.B.U.H.). Thus group after group answered their invitation and joined them and it went on like this until Yazīd b. Mu‘āwīya died.”
The author of Jihād al-Shī‘a” (Struggle of the Shi‘ites) correctly comments that, “After the martyrdom of Ḥusayn (P.B.U.H.), the Shi‘ite population was like a composed and organized gathering whose political ties and religious beliefs gave them integrity and had appeared as a gathering of leaders and military forces, and the group of Penitents (Tawwābīn) was the first existing example of its kind.”
As it can be understood from the study of historical events and also from the viewpoints of these historians, in the incidents of Mu‘āwīya’s era as well as events after the martyrdom of Imam Ḥusayn (P.B.U.H.), the only initiatives and the designing and leadership of these events were related to the Shi‘ites and in their hands; otherwise, there were many ordinary people that by humanitarian motives or for dissatisfaction of the Umayyad rule apparatus or other motives and causes, practically joined the Shi‘ites as their companions and participated alongside them in the fields of battle or in actions, which were of Shi‘ite tone. Therefore it should not be imagined that all those who participated in the various adventures of that part of history and had an active or common role in it were among the Shi‘ites, namely they were in the Imams’ (P.B.U.T.) orderly and calculated organization.
Keeping the explanation given above in mind, a point that I want to stress is that until the period in question–namely, after the martyrdom of Imam Ḥusayn (P.B.U.H.)–the name and term “Shi‘ite”, like in the days of Amīr al-Mu’minīn (P.B.U.H.) was applied only to those who had a strong and specific relationship, in thinking and practice, with the righteous Imam (P.B.U.H.). It was this same group who had created the consistent Shi‘ite organization after Imam Ḥasan’s (P.B.U.H.) peace and by the order of his holiness. It was these same people who, with their own successive and deep preaching, brought others within the boundaries of that organization and attracted more people who were not similar to them in thinking and ideology to the undertakings of the Shi‘ites. There is no doubt, the narration that we quoted from Imam Ṣādiq (P.B.U.H.) at the beginning of this discourse–that limited the number of Shi‘ites to three or five persons–refers to those belonging to this category; that is, the Shi‘ites and perseverant followers of the Imams (P.B.U.T.); those who had a conscientious role and decisive part in the movement and the course of the dynamic evolution of the ‘Alawite and Hashemite revolution.
Due to Imam Ṣādiq’s (P.B.U.H.) clandestine and apparently calm efforts, this group recovered and attracted and spread its potential elements, and as Imam Ṣādiq (P.B.U.H.) said in a narration that was just mentioned, the ordinary people joined it and increased in number. It was this very group, during the eras of Imam Sajjād, Imam Bāqir and Imam Ṣādiq (P.B.U.T.), whose dubious movements made the chiefs of Caliphate regime fearful and sometimes incited them to show violent reactions.
To sum up, in Shi‘ite culture and also in non-Shi‘ite concepts and understanding in the early centuries of Islam and during the time of the Imams (P.B.U.T.) the name “Shi‘ite” did not apply to anyone who only had the love of members of the Prophet’s (P.B.U.H. & H.H.) household or only believed in their legitimacy and the truth of their invitation–although he had not participated in areas of activity and a movement whose center and axis was the Imam (P.B.U.H.)–but apart from these, being a Shi‘ite had a fundamental and indisputable condition and that included “intellectual and practical cohesion with the Imam (P.B.U.H.) and participation in the activities which were done with the Imam’s initiative and leadership in order to restore the usurped rights and to establish the ‘Alawite and Islamic system on various intellectual, political, and possibly military levels.” This cohesion is the same as what is called Wilāya (guardianship) in the Shi‘ite culture. In fact, “Shi‘ite” was a name for the party of the Imamate; a party which was involved in some specific activities with the leadership of the Imam (P.B.U.H.) and like all opposing parties and organizations in the age of strangulation, lived in concealment and taqīyyah. This is an abstract and detailed summary of the lives of the Imams (P.B.U.T.), particularly Imam Ṣādiq (P.B.U.H.). As I said previously, this is not something that one can expect to wait for explicit arguments to prove it; because one should never wait for a tableau above the door of a hidden house upon which is written: “This is a hidden house”. Although one cannot take its existence as granted without indispensable evidence. So, it is worthwhile to undertake searching for the evidence and testimonies.