After having been jailed in Hārūn al-Rashīd’s prison for a long time, Imam Mūsā b. Ja‘far (P.B.U.H.) was poisoned and died martyr. Total suppression ruled over the extensive domain of the Abbasids’ realm. In that oppressive atmosphere, when Hārūn al-Rashīd had his blood-thirsty sword in hand, our infallible Imam’s (P.B.U.H.) greatest ingenuity was to protect the sprouting Shi‘ism against the vicissitudes of the time, to prevent the friends of his dear father from dispersion and despair and to keep safe his (own) life, which was the pivot and (truly) the spirit of the Shi‘ite population, through a wonderful precautionary dissimulation.
Throughout the period when the most powerful Abbasid caliphs were in power and when (the ruling) regime was fully and firmly established, he (P.B.U.H.) continued the campaign of the Imamate (against tyranny). But history has not been able to give us a clear picture of the ten-year period in the eighth Imam’s (P.B.U.H.) life at the time of Hārūn al-Rashīd and after him, that is, during the five year civil war between Khurāsān and Baghdad.
But through reflection it can be understood that the eighth Imam (P.B.U.H.) carried on the same long-running campaign and followed the same direction and aim that the Ahl al-Bayt (P.B.U.T.) had perpetuated throughout the years after ‘Āshūrā.
In 198 after Hijra, when Ma’mūn finished the struggle for power against (his brother) Amīn and took in his hand the full control over the then uncontested (office of) caliphate, one of his plans was to put an end to the problem of the ‘Alawite and to the campaigns that Shi‘ites ran. He had, before his eyes, all experience of his predecessors that showed (him) the day-to-day increase in the power, extent and depth of the (‘Alawī) movement (on the one hand) and the weakness of the rulers in uprooting, stopping or even controlling it (on the other). He noted that Hārūn’s majesty and splendor had not been able to stop the Shi‘ites’ uprisings and political, military, propaganda and intellectual campaigns, even by imprisoning and poisoning the seventh Imam (P.B.U.H.).
Besides, Ma’mūn, who did not enjoy the same (degree of) might as his father and his predecessors did, had (already) sensed that the Abbasid rule was being threatened by serious problems subsequent to the civil war among (the members of) the Abbasid family. No doubt, it was necessary for him to take the ‘Alawite movement more seriously. He might have given the situation a more (apparently) realistic consideration when he evaluated the danger posed by the Shi‘ites.
Probably, the fifteen-year period between the seventh Imam’s (P.B.U.H.) martyrdom and the day (Ma’mūn came to power)–and in particular the five-year civil war–provided the Shi‘ites with a particular opportunity to prepare themselves more to raise the banner of the ‘Alawite rule. This was a danger Ma’mūn had cunningly guessed, and made preparations to confront it. Following this assessment and realization the Imam (P.B.U.H.), who lived at Medina, was invited to Khurāsān, where he was offered to succeed Ma’mūn. This was a singular or unique occurrence throughout the course of the Imamate, because the eighth Imam, ‘Alī b. Mūsā al-Riḍā (P.B.U.H.), was exposed to a great trial and a hidden political campaign on which the fate of the Shi‘ites depended, i.e. success or defeat.
The fully-equipped competitor, Ma’mūn, who had the capacity to take the initiative, stepped into the arena. He was extremely clever, considerably tactful, and uniquely intelligent. If he had succeeded to carry out what he had planned, he would have certainly attained the goal which no other Umayyads and Abbasid caliph had reached in spite of the efforts they had been making from the time Imam ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (P.B.U.H.) was martyred in the 40th year after Hijra, i.e. he would have succeeded in uprooting the sprouting tree of Shi‘ism and obliterating the opposing current, which was a constant source of irritation for the oppressive rulers.
However, through a divinely scheme, the eighth Imam (P.B.U.H.) overcame Ma’mūn and totally defeated him in the political campaign that Ma’mūn himself had launched. Thus, Shi‘ism was not weakened, nor was it uprooted. Rather, it experienced one of the most blissful years in its history-the year 201 after Hijra–when Imam Riḍā (P.B.U.H.) was named successor to Ma’mūn. Now, a fresh vitality was visible in the ‘Alawite campaign–all this came from the eighth infallible Imam’s (P.B.U.H.) divinely scheme and his wise manner of action in this difficult test.
In order to illuminate this extraordinary event, we will briefly explain Ma’mūn’s plot and the Imam’s (P.B.U.H.) scheme.
Ma’mūn aimed at several targets, the first and the most important of which was to reduce the Shi‘ites’ acute revolutionary campaigns to peaceful and safe political activities. The Shi‘ites, however, continued their unending and untiring struggles secretly. The Shi‘ites’ battles, which disrupted the caliphal organization to the point that is beyond description, had in it two characteristics: “the state of being oppressed” and “holiness”.
These are the two elements the Shi‘ites depended on in their attempt to spread into the hearts and minds of their addressees the Shi‘ite thought, which is the interpretation and explanation of Islam as the Imams of the household of the Prophet (P.B.U.T.) viewed it. Thus, they would make people be inclined to or believe in this ideology. In this way, there was a day-to-day expansion of the scope of Shi‘ism within the world of Islam. These two elements–“the oppressed” and “holy states,”–supported by Shi‘ite thought, organized in various localities the armed uprisings and rebellious attempts against the caliphate rulers.
Ma’mūn had the desire to remove the veil that kept the combatants in hiding, causing the Imam (P.B.U.H.) to leave the field of revolutionary campaign and step into the arena of politics. In this way, he thought he would (be able to) reduce to nothingness the efficiency of the Shi‘ite movement that had already gained momentum in hiding, and would pluck out of the hand of ‘Alawīs the two penetrating peculiarities. Consequently the group whose leader was the preeminent personage in the caliphal organization and the vice-gerent to the despotic king and could exercise control over the country’s affairs would be considered neither oppressed nor that much holy. This plan could place the Shi‘ite ideology on the same level as other dogmas that had some advocates in the society, converting it into a non-opposing force even if it attracted the common people, especially the weak and posed questions (in their minds).
The second goal was disproving the claim of the Shi‘ites, who had asserted that the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates had been (established) through usurpation, and legitimizing these caliphates. Ma’mūn could thus cunningly prove to the Shi‘ites that their claim in considering the dominant caliphates unlawful and illegal was baseless–even though in Shi‘ism this was an article of faith–and came from weakness and inferiority complexes. If successions to previous caliphs’ governments were illegal and tyrannical, (one might conclude that) Ma’mūn’s was like them, but now that Imam ‘Alī b. Mūsā al-Riḍā (P.B.U.H.) has joined the office and agreed to succeed Ma’mūn, he (P.B.U.H.) was assumed to have acknowledged Ma’mūn’s (rules), and the other caliphs’ as lawful, and this would disprove the Shi‘ites’ assertions. Ma’mūn would thus have Imam ‘Alī b. Mūsā al-Riḍā (P.B.U.H.) recognize Ma’mūn as well as his predecessors’ governments as legitimate. Besides, he would smash one of the basic beliefs in Shi‘ism: that the previous governments were cruel.
A further assertion of Shi‘ism that would (sequentially) have been invalidated was the belief that the Imams (P.B.U.T.) were paragons of asceticism and piety, who disregarded the worldly matters. This would imply that Imam Riḍā (P.B.U.H.) was detached from materialism (merely) so long as he had no access to it. Now that he has the doors of the worldly felicity open before him, he hurriedly moves toward it, enjoying it as others do!
As the third goal Ma’mūn would have the Imam (P.B.U.H.), the permanent focus of opposition and campaign and all other ‘Alawite rebels and warriors under the surveillance of his own organization. This was the opportunity no other Umayyad or Abbasid rulers before Ma’mūn had ever had the chance to enjoy.
The fourth goal was to have the Imam (P.B.U.H.)–the hope of the people, the authority who answered their questions and (heard) their complaints–blockaded by the government agents, and aloof from the populace; this would in time diminish his popularity and would be a cause for the people’s esteem and love to fade away.
The fifth goal was that Ma’mūn would acquire spiritual prestige for appointing a son of the Prophet (P.B.U.H. & H.H.) and holy personage as his heir and depriving his brothers and sons of this position. The mingling of men of piety with those who seek the material world always lowers the former in prestige and raises the latter in esteem.
The sixth and final goal was that Ma’mūn thought that the Imam (P.B.U.H.) might be rendered to a person who would justify the deeds of the caliphal system (of rule). Had the Imam (P.B.U.H.), who was extensively knowledgeable, pious, and the uniquely respected son of the Prophet (P.B.U.H.), justified the procedures of the caliphate organization, nobody could have voiced an opposition, nor could the regime’s prestige have been hurt. This would serve (as) a retaining wall hiding all errors and indecencies of the caliphate organization.
Evidently, Ma’mūn’s plot was so complex that no one else could lead it through; so even those closest to him were unaware of its scope and dimensions. Certain historical reports indicate that even Faḍl b. Sahl, the man in charge of two offices (i.e. military and civil) was unaware of its real dimensions. To safeguard his aims, Ma’mūn faked stories. Ma’mūn’s scheme was exceptionally deep and well-planned. However, Imam Riḍā’s (P.B.U.H.) presence turned Ma’mūn’s best-laid and ingenious plan ineffective– making it look like a child’s toy. In spite of all the trouble he had taken and heavy investment he had made, Ma’mūn gained nothing. His plan of action met with a counter plan: he had targeted the Imam’s (P.B.U.H.) prestige and claim, but he himself suffered the outcome. Soon he had to nullify his past plans and follow his predecessors’ manners against the Imams (P.B.U.T.)–that is, “murdering” him. In spite of his desire and endeavor to look a saintly and wise caliph, he was finally dumped into the same landfill in which the past caliphs had fallen: corruption, indecencies, debauchery, frivolity, tyranny, and arrogance. That he was a hypocrite could be seen from scores of examples during the fifteen-year period after the issue of choosing himself an heir. He employed Yaḥya b. Aktham, a debauched, evil-doer, and irresponsible supreme judge, took Ibrāhīm b. Mahdī, the singer, as his boon companion, and held frivolous and lewd gatherings at his court in Baghdad.
